Absorbing Games with a Signalling Structure
Author:
- 1 May 2001
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 26 (2) , 286-303
Abstract
We consider a subclass of two-person zero-sum undiscounted stochastic games called absorbing games. The perfect monitoring assumption is removed. Instead of being informed of his opponent's previous action, each player is informed of a signal that randomly depends on both player's previous actions. The existence of the max min and similarly of the min max is established.Keywords
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