Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: Folk versus philosophical phenomenality
- 15 May 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 27 (6) , 862-889
Abstract
Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people's understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness.Keywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Feeling robots and human zombies: Mind perception and the uncanny valleyCognition, 2012
- More dead than dead: Perceptions of persons in the persistent vegetative stateCognition, 2011
- Subjective Consciousness2009
- Commonsense concepts of phenomenal consciousness: Does anyone care about functional zombies?Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2009
- Theoretical approaches to the diagnosis of altered states of consciousness2009
- Integrated Information in Discrete Dynamical Systems: Motivation and Theoretical FrameworkPLOS Computational Biology, 2008
- Intuitions about consciousness: Experimental studiesPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2007
- Dimensions of Mind PerceptionScience, 2007
- The control of the false discovery rate in multiple testing under dependencyThe Annals of Statistics, 2001
- Purple Haze2001