An Implementation-Theoretic Approach to Non-cooperative Foundations
Authors:
- James BerginJBJames Bergin
- John DugganJDJohn Duggan
- 1 May 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 86 (1) , 50-76
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
This publication has 40 references indexed in Scilit:
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