Abstract
Bit commitment is a fundamental cryptographic primitive and a cornerstone for numerous two-party cryptographic protocols, including zero-knowledge proofs. However, it has been proven that unconditionally secure bit commitment, both classical and quantum, is impossible. In this work, we demonstrate that imposing a restriction on the committing party to perform only separable operations enables secure quantum bit-commitment schemes. Specifically, we prove that in any perfectly hiding bit-commitment protocol, an honestly committing party limited to separable operations will be detected with high probability if they attempt to alter their commitment. To illustrate our findings, we present an example protocol.
Funding Information
  • Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (41829458)
  • Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca (816000-2022-SQUID - CUP F83C22002390007)

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