Spacetime Substantivalism and Einstein's Cosmological Constant
Author:
- 1 December 2005
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 72 (5) , 1299-1311
Abstract
I offer a novel argument for spacetime substantivalism: We should take the spacetime of general relativity to be a substance because of its active role in gravitational causation. As a clear example of this causal behavior I offer the cosmological constant, a term in the most general form of the Einstein field equations which causes free floating objects to accelerate apart. This acceleration cannot, I claim, be causally explained except by reference to spacetime itself.Keywords
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