The impact of high-pressure political reforms on state-owned enterprises: Evidence from China
Authors:
- Sung C. BaeSBSung C. Bae
- Taek Ho KwonTKTaek Ho Kwon
- Chenyang LiuCLChenyang Liu
- 11 October 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 91
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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