A Comprehensive Side-Channel Information Leakage Analysis of an In-Order RISC CPU Microarchitecture

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Abstract
Side-channel attacks are a prominent threat to the security of embedded systems. To perform them, an adversary evaluates the goodness of fit of a set of key-dependent power consumption models to a collection of side-channel measurements taken from an actual device, identifying the secret key value as the one yielding the best-fitting model. In this work, we analyze for the first time the microarchitectural components of a 32-bit in-order RISC CPU, showing which one of them is accountable for unexpected side-channel information leakage. We classify the leakage sources, identifying the data serialization points in the microarchitecture and providing a set of hints that can be fruitfully exploited to generate implementations resistant against side-channel attacks, either writing or generating proper assembly code.
Funding Information
  • Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (671668 and 688201)

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