The Contract Design of Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Enterprise Innovation Investment: Evidence from China
Open Access
- 1 February 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by MDPI AG in Sustainability
- Vol. 15 (3) , 2601
Abstract
Enterprise innovation is a key driver of national economic growth. How to stimulate employees’ innovation vitality to improve the company’s innovation input and output has always been a hot topic. Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) is one of the effective means to stimulate employees’ innovation vitality by linking employee wealth with firm value. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of ESOP implementation and contract design on enterprise innovation investment in the context of the recent booming development of ESOP in China. First, we use a treatment effect model to examine the impact of ESOP implementation on innovation investment, taking firms that implement ESOPs as the treatment group and firms that do not implement ESOPs as the control group. Second, we use multivariate regression models to test the impact of ESOP contract design (including fund source, stock source, lockup period, duration, shareholding scale, executive subscription ratio, participation degree, and management mode) on innovation investment using the treatment group. The results indicate that the implementation of ESOP is helpful in increasing enterprise innovation investment, and the impact of ESOP on innovation investment varies significantly with the design of incentive contracts.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (71802044, N2206013)
- Central University Basic Research Fund of China (71802044, N2206013)
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