Contract farming led by a seed enterprise and incentives to produce high quality: Which contract design performs best?
- 23 May 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Agribusiness
- Vol. 39 (4) , 1173-1198
Abstract
Motivated by real‐world practices in China, we consider a three‐level agri‐food supply chain consisting of a seed enterprise, a grower, and a buyer–processor, where the seed enterprise is fully vertically integrated in the seed industry and acts as the leader to coordinate the grower and buyer–processor of the agri‐food supply chain. We call this seed company‐led agri‐food contract farming. First, we develop analytical models to derive optimal solutions under penalty contracts, revenue‐sharing contracts and cost‐sharing contracts. Then, we analytically compare the optimal strategies of the three contracts using data from China's fresh maize industry as the numerical example. Finally, we do the sensitivity analysis of contract parameters. Results demonstrate that: (1) The seed company‐led agri‐food contract farming obtains quality advantages and improves profits by responding quickly to external demand changes and effectively coordinating internal technical capabilities. (2) The penalty contract performs poorly in both quality and profit. (3) The profit of the whole supply chain increases with the increase of the revenue‐sharing proportion from downstream supply chain participants to upstream participants; but the relationship between the proportion of cost‐sharing and the profit of the whole supply chain is nonmonotonic. [EconLit Citations: C79, O13, Q13].Keywords
This publication has 37 references indexed in Scilit:
- An Assessment of Potato Contract Farming in West Bengal State, IndiaPotato Research, 2014
- The Political Economy of Contract Farming in China's Agrarian TransitionJournal of Agrarian Change, 2012
- Demythifying contract farming: Evidence from rural South AfricaAgrekon, 2012
- Agricultural extension and imperfect supervision in contract farming: evidence from MadagascarAgricultural Economics, 2010
- Interactions Between Incentive Instruments: Contracts and Quality in Processing TomatoesAmerican Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2010
- State Sector Reform and Agriculture in ChinaThe China Quarterly, 2006
- Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape IndustryReview of Industrial Organization, 2003
- Contract Farming, Smallholders, and Rural Development in Latin America: The Organization of Agroprocessing Firms and the Scale of Outgrower ProductionWorld Development, 1999
- Vertical Coordination, Producer Response, and the Locus of Control over Agricultural Production Decisions1Rural Sociology, 1997
- Contract farming and smallholder outgrower schemes in less-developed countriesWorld Development, 1984