Delegation in international monetary policy games∗
Authors:
- Juan J. DoladoJDJuan J. Dolado
- Mark GriffithsMGMark Griffiths
- A.Jorge PadillaAPA.Jorge Padilla
- 1 May 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 38 (5) , 1057-1069
Abstract
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This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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