The Effect of Mergers on Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin
Authors:
- Orley AshenfelterOAOrley Ashenfelter
- Daniel HoskenDHDaniel Hosken
- 1 August 2010
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 53 (3) , 417-466
Abstract
In this paper we propose a method to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. horizontal merger policy and apply it to the study of five recently consummated consumer products mergers. We select the mergers from those that, from the public record, seem most likely to be problematic. Thus, we estimate an upper bound on the likely price effect of completed mergers. Our study employs retail scanner data and uses familiar panel data program evaluation procedures to measure price changes. Our results indicate that four of the five mergers resulted in some increases in consumer prices, while the fifth merger had little effect.Keywords
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