Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication
- 7 January 2013
- journal article
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 280 (1750) , 20121878
Abstract
Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as traditional costly signalling, and we suggest a number of experiments that might be used to distinguish the two theories.Keywords
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