Indigent Defense Counsel, Attorney Quality, and Defendant Outcomes
- 7 May 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in American Law and Economics Review
- Vol. 16 (2) , 577-619
Abstract
County governments typically provide legal defense services for the indigent through one of two methods: public defenders and assigned counsel. I measure differences in defendant outcomes between these two types of counsel, finding that assigned counsel generate significantly less favorable outcomes for defendants than public defenders. Since assigned counsel work involves attorneys selecting into it, outside labor market options could affect attorney selection decisions. With that in mind, I analyze how attorneys of different quality levels respond to exogenous changes in their respective outside options, finding a significant impact on the performance of assigned counsel relative to public defenders.Keywords
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