Endogenous choice of price or quantity contract and the implications of two-part-tariff in a vertical structure
Authors:
- Debasmita BasakDBDebasmita Basak
- Leonard F.S. WangLWLeonard F.S. Wang
- 1 January 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 138, 53-56
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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