Monetary-fiscal interactions under price level targeting
Preprint
- 28 October 2020
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
The adoption of a "makeup'' strategy is one of the proposals adopted in the ongoing review of the Fed's monetary policy framework. Another suggestion, to avoid the zero lower bound, is a more active role for fiscal policy. We put together these ideas to study monetary-fiscal interactions under price level targeting. Under price level targeting and a fiscally-led regime, we find that following a deflationary demand shock: (i) the central bank increases (rather than decreases) the policy rate; (ii) the central bank, thus, avoids the zero lower bound; (iii) price level targeting is generally welfare improving if compared to inflation targeting.Keywords
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