Heterogeneous facility location without money
Authors:
- Paolo SerafinoPSPaolo Serafino
- Carmine VentreCVCarmine Ventre
- 1 July 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 636, 27-46
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- EPSRC (EP/M018113/1)
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