Family Firms and Employee Pension Underfunding: Good Corporate Citizens or Unethical Opportunists?
Open Access
- 25 September 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 192 (2) , 323-339
Abstract
This study draws upon the behavioral agency model and the concept of socioemotional wealth to investigate how family firms’ employee pension underfunding decisions differ from those of non-family firms. We explore how these differences are influenced by financial distress, generational stage, and whether the firm is eponymous. We test our hypotheses using data from 452 US firms over an eleven-year period. Our results suggest that family firms are less likely to underfund pensions, but this effect is attenuated in later generational ownership stages and in non-eponymous firms.Keywords
Funding Information
- University of Melbourne
This publication has 101 references indexed in Scilit:
- Planning for Growth: Life Stage Differences in Family FirmsEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2013
- Executive Stock Options as Mixed Gambles: Revisiting the Behavioral Agency ModelAcademy of Management Journal, 2013
- Socioemotional Wealth in Family FirmsFamily Business Review, 2012
- Emerging Trends in Global Ethics: A Comparative Study of U.S. and International Family Business ValuesJournal of Business Ethics, 2011
- Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Private Family FirmsFamily Business Review, 2010
- Strategic Use of CSR as a Signal for Good ManagementSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- Are We Family and Are We Treated as Family? Nonfamily Employees’ Perceptions of Justice in the Family FirmEntrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 2006
- A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk TakingAcademy of Management Review, 1998
- The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effectsBiometrika, 1983
- Power, Performance, and Succession in the Large CorporationAdministrative Science Quarterly, 1982