Extremal Principle Solutions of Games in Characteristic Function Form: Core, Chebychev and Shapley Value Generalizations
Authors:
- A. CharnesACA. Charnes
- B. GolanyBGB. Golany
- M. KeaneMKM. Keane
- 1 January 1988
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 123-133
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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