Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
Authors:
- Matthieu BouvardMBMatthieu Bouvard
- Pierre ChaigneauPCPierre Chaigneau
- Adolfo DE MottaAMAdolfo DE Motta
- 23 July 2015
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 70 (4) , 1805-1837
Abstract
We present a theory of optimal transparency when banks are exposed to rollover risk. Disclosing bank‐specific information enhances the stability of the financial system during crises, but has a destabilizing effect in normal economic times. Thus, the regulator optimally increases transparency during crises. Under this policy, however, information disclosure signals a deterioration of economic fundamentals, which gives the regulator ex post incentives to withhold information. This commitment problem precludes a disclosure policy that provides ex ante optimal insurance against aggregate shocks, and can result in excess opacity that increases the likelihood of a systemic crisis.Keywords
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