Solution of Some Stochastic Quadratic Nash and Leader-Follower Games

Author:
  • GPG. P. Papavassilopoulos
    G. P. Papavassilopoulos

Abstract
The linear quadratic Gaussian static Nash and Stackelberg two-player games are considered and completely solved. Necessary and sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the solutions are presented as well as the procedure for finding all the solutions. For the Nash game, in particular, it is shown that if there exists a solution there will exist a solution affine in the information, and that the solution will be nonunique if (intuitively) the coupling of the information of the two players equals some power of the inverse of the coupling of their costs. Many interesting dynamic cases with nested information structures can be reduced to static ones and are essentially covered by the analysis presented.

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