Smooth calibration, leaky forecasts, finite recall, and Nash dynamics
- 1 May 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 109, 271-293
Abstract
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Funding Information
- European Research Council (Advanced Investigator grant)
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