Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference
Authors:
- Paul HuthPHPaul Huth
- Bruce RussettBRBruce Russett
- 1 July 1990
- journal article
- Published by Project MUSE in World Politics
- Vol. 42 (4) , 466-501
Abstract
There is no consensus among scholars on how to test hypotheses about deterrence systematically. The disputes are sometimes rooted in differences about theory or sources of data, but they are magnified by methodological confusion, especially over concepts and operational definitions that produce perverse empirical results. Serious theoretical errors include inadequate appreciation of the role of uncertainty in deterrence as well as selection biases that undermine empirical tests. Rigorous examination of our previous work in light of recent criticism discloses very robust findings on the conditions for deterrence success and failure.Keywords
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