Abstract
Government loan guarantees support SMEs worldwide, but program evaluations usually treat them as bank-firm credit products and ignore the supply chain context. A strategic supplier can adjust the wholesale price in response to a guarantee, and demand uncertainty adds operational risk absent from standard guarantee models. We incorporate a government guarantee in a newsvendor supply chain with a Stackelberg supplier, a capital-constrained retailer, and a competitive bank. Where pass-through is positive, a stronger guarantee raises the wholesale price, and the supplier captures part of the relief, while the retailer can be worse off than under no guarantee. Default risk can rise when lower borrowing costs induce higher borrowing amounts. At high coverage, loan spreads can approach zero even as default risk remains positive, making spreads a poor proxy for borrower or government risk. Furthermore, the government guarantee alone need not materially raise supply-chain efficiency. In the numerical analysis, higher demand variability and coverage increase default risk and expected government payments. Retailers with low working capital generate more incremental credit and larger expected government payments. Partial trade credit can raise efficiency and reduce government exposure simultaneously. A uniform coverage ratio has heterogeneous fiscal consequences. These results suggest that differentiated coverage by borrower wealth and demand risk is desirable.