Strategic inventory in capacitated supply chain procurement
- 9 January 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 29 (1) , 23-36
Abstract
We study the strategic role of inventory in a sequential two‐period procurement setting, where the supplier's capacity in the first period is limited and the retailer has the option to hold inventory. We compare the equilibrium under a dynamic contract, where the decisions are made at the beginning of each period, and a commitment contract, where the decisions for both periods are made at the beginning of the first period. We show that there is a critical capacity level below which the outcomes under both types of contracts are identical. When the first period capacity is above the critical level, the retailer holds inventory in equilibrium and the inventory is carried due to purely strategic reasons; as capacity increases, so does the strategic role of inventory. The supplier always prefers lower capacity than the retailer, and the difference between supplier‐optimal and supply‐chain optimal capacities, and the corresponding profits, can be significant. Finally, we find that the retailer's flexibility to hold inventory is not always good for the participants or for the channel. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Cyclical Behavior of Strategic InventoriesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989
- The role of obsolescence and inventory costs in providing commitmentInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 1986