The Limits of Spectatorial Folk Psychology
- 20 October 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 19 (5) , 548-573
Abstract
Abstract: It is almost universally agreed that the main business of commonsense psychology is that of providing generally reliable predictions and explanations of the actions of others. In line with this, it is also generally assumed that we are normally at theoretical remove from others such that we are always ascribing causally efficacious mental states to them for the purpose of prediction, explanation and control. Building on the work of those who regard our primary intersubjective interactions as a form of ‘embodied practice’, I defend a second‐personal approach in this paper.Keywords
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