Abstract
Gig economy platforms compete to source labor from common pools of workers, and workers multihome by dynamically allocating their services in real-time across multiple platforms. The question of how workers choose between competing platforms has grown in salience. However, understanding workers' dynamic multihoming decisions and their impact on the labor supply and operations of platforms has been challenging due to limited data. We study gig workers' dynamic multihoming decisions by integrating a major ride-hailing platform's proprietary data regarding individual drivers' detailed trips with public data on the drivers' outside options. Using methods that combine simulation with machine learning, we structurally estimate the perceived costs that motivate drivers' forward-looking decisions and behavior. Our analysis shows that workers are short-sighted and value consistent rewards over variable rewards. Based on these findings, our counterfactual analyses explore the impact of compensation and incentives on the platform's labor supply and operations. We find that consistent pay dominates variable pay per task at retaining multihoming workers in order to maintain a stable platform workforce. Platforms can further control their labor supply by rewarding uninterrupted work or delaying quits. Our research gives gig economy platforms and policymakers insights regarding the design of optimal incentive schemes and regulations, and we specifically evaluate the impact of New York City's 2018 Driver Income Rules on multihoming behavior.

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