Abstract
Conventional automated radiation-monitoring systems were designed for peacetime conditions and rely on hierarchical, hub-and-spoke topologies that are highly vulnerable to kinetic damage and electronic countermeasures. Operational experience accumulated since 2022 at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has shown that such legacy architectures cannot guarantee the continuity of dose-rate observations in active combat zones, creating an unacceptable transboundary radiological risk. This paper proposes a systems approach to the design of an adaptive sensor field that combines stationary stations, mobile UAV/UGV platforms and disposable autonomous microsensors into a single heterogeneous mesh network. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) was used to rank sensing alternatives against five criteria, and a probabilistic survivability model was derived to compare centralised and mesh topologies under combined kinetic and electronic-warfare (EW) pressure. A field-deployable measurement node based on the J305 Geiger–Müller tube, an ESP32 micro-controller and a LoRa Meshtastic back-haul is described in detail, together with results from a 372-point walking survey in Kyiv and from a 24 h observation that captured the G4 geomagnetic storm of 5 May 2023. The proposed mesh field retains a survivability of Sfield = 0.78 at 40% node loss, against 0.12 for the centralised baseline—a 6.5-fold advantage that justifies the higher initial deployment cost in contested environments.

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