Auction design and tacit collusion in FCC spectrum auctions
Authors:
- Jungwon YeoJYJungwon Yeo
- 1 June 2009
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Information Economics and Policy
- Vol. 21 (2) , 90-100
Abstract
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This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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