Inferring Strategic Voting
- 1 April 2013
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 103 (2) , 624-662
Abstract
We estimate a model of strategic voting and quantify the impact it has on election outcomes. Because the model exhibits multiplicity of outcomes, we adopt a set estimator. Using Japanese general-election data, we find a large fraction (63.4 percent, 84.9 percent) of strategic voters, only a small fraction (1.4 percent, 4.2 percent) of whom voted for a candidate other than the one they most preferred (misaligned voting). Existing empirical literature has not distinguished between the two, estimating misaligned voting instead of strategic voting. Accordingly, while our estimate of strategic voting is high, our estimate of misaligned voting is comparable to previous studies. (JEL D72)Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Do voters vote ideologically?Journal of Economic Theory, 2009
- The performance of pivotal-voter models in small-scale elections: Evidence from Texas liquor referendaJournal of Public Economics, 2008
- Estimation and Confidence Regions for Parameter Sets in Econometric ModelsEconometrica, 2007
- WHAT AFFECTS VOTER TURNOUT?Annual Review of Political Science, 2006
- Electoral Competition in Heterogeneous DistrictsJournal of Political Economy, 2005
- Measuring strategic voting in multiparty plurality electionsElectoral Studies, 2001
- A New Approach for Modelling Strategic Voting in Multiparty ElectionsBritish Journal of Political Science, 2000
- Automobile Prices in Market EquilibriumEconometrica, 1995
- Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable VoteAmerican Political Science Review, 1994
- Rationalizable Strategic BehaviorEconometrica, 1984