Experimental investigation of stationary concepts in cyclic duopoly games
Open Access
- 1 September 2009
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 12 (3) , 253-271
Abstract
We experimentally test the predictive success of three stationary concepts in two cyclic duopoly games. The concepts are Nash equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium and payoff-sampling equilibrium. In the experiment 11 independent subject groups, consisting out of six participants interacting over 200 rounds, were gathered for each game. The comparison of the three concepts with mixed strategies shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: payoff-sampling equilibrium, impulse-balance equilibrium, and Nash equilibrium. In addition the data exhibit a weak but significant tendency over time in the direction of coordination at a pure strategy equilibrium.Keywords
This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
- Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2-GamesAmerican Economic Review, 2008
- z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsExperimental Economics, 2007
- Games of Competition in a Stochastic EnvironmentTheory and Decision, 2005
- Learning Direction Theory and the Winner's CurseExperimental Economics, 2005
- Cyclic Games: An Introduction and Some ExamplesGames and Economic Behavior, 2001
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash EquilibriumEconometrica, 1993
- Testing the Minimax Hypothesis: A Re-Examination of O'Neill's Game ExperimentEconometrica, 1990
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under RiskEconometrica, 1979