Why private firms are more innovative than public firms
Author:
- Lorenz NettLNLorenz Nett
- 1 December 1994
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 10 (4) , 639-653
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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