Abstract
Most standard performance models neglect adversarial reliability, the probability that a system behaves correctly under attack. We propose a framework to assess and improve it centred on chokepoints, intersections of intrusions, where single defensive updates disproportionately constrain an adversary. Our approach relies on a three-layer ontology: a quantitative security twin of the infrastructure, Monte Carlo simulations of attacker strategies to build intrusions, and an intrusion graph that merges the intrusions to discover chokepoints. From this graph, we estimate metrics such as the traversal frequency, the Mean-Time-To-Compromise (MTTC), the probability of breach Pbreach(t) and the availability-under-attack Aadv. This common foundation unifies seven security problems into chokepoint analyses, including network segmentation, IDS and honeypot allocation, forensic reconstruction, and global joint budget optimisation against zero-day vulnerabilities. Because the security twin can be built from architectural specifications and CVE databases, our approach can assess both security-by-design and operational adversarial reliability. Experiments on the security twins of two real systems and on synthetic topologies up to |V| = 10,000 show significant reliability improvements: at a representative security budget equal to 5% of the total deployment cost of the assets of the system, the joint allocation increases the MTTC by 3.9× over the undefended baseline, and the design-time predictions match post-deployment measurements within 8%.

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