When Recycling Meets Variety: Product Design and Policy Intervention under Extended Producer Responsibility
Authors:
- Yuxiao ChenYCYuxiao Chen
- Tingliang HuangTHTingliang Huang
- Chengzhang LiCLChengzhang Li
- Qinghua ZhuQZQinghua Zhu
Preprint
- 20 April 2026
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) has been proposed to shift the burden of end-of-life (EoL) collection and recycling from the public sector to manufacturers, aiming to incentivize sustainable product design. Yet, as firms increasingly rely on product differentiation to compete for heterogeneous consumers, recycling complexity rises and reshapes design incentives in unexpected ways. We develop a stylized model with two competing manufacturers and one shared recycler whose recycling cost increases in product differentiation. We first analyze a centralized benchmark and show that EPR overturns conventional wisdom on product differentiation: firms may deliberately reduce differentiation to alleviate recycling costs, and when recycling costs are sufficiently high, product cannibalization can even emerge as the optimal design strategy. We then examine the impact of recycling structure on the EPR implementation. When recycling is outsourced to an independent recycler, market coverage declines, product segmentation increases, and overall profitability decreases relative to the centralized benchmark. Paradoxically, this structure improves environmental performance by limiting excessive differentiation and total output. When recycling is vertically integrated, coordination frictions are eliminated and profitability is restored, but the resulting expansion in differentiation and market coverage generates the highest environmental burden. Since direct EPR implementation cannot reconcile the tension between economic efficiency and environmental performance, we further explore government intervention schemes that reshape the economic–environmental frontier. Government-intervened individual producer responsibility (GIPR) flexibly balances profitability and environmental impact, whereas government-operated collective producer responsibility (GCPR) is more effective at curbing environmental impact. As a result, the regulator’s preferred intervention format depends critically on the environmental priority: GIPR is preferred when environmental concerns are limited, while GCPR becomes dominant when environmental priority is high. Furthermore, we establish a one-to-one mapping between environmental priorities and policy parameters, providing implementable guidance for regulators. Our study underscores the importance of incorporating differentiation-induced recycling costs into product design under EPR and highlights the fundamental economic–environmental tension that should inform effective policy design.Keywords
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