The effort and risk-taking effects of budget-based contracts
Authors:
- Geoffrey B. SprinkleGSGeoffrey B. Sprinkle
- Michael G. WilliamsonMWMichael G. Williamson
- David R. UptonDUDavid R. Upton
- 1 May 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 33 (4-5) , 436-452
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
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