Non-Exclusive Notifications for Ride-Hailing at Lyft II: Simulations and Marketplace Analysis
Authors:
- Farbod EkbataniFEFarbod Ekbatani
- Rad NiazadehRNRad Niazadeh
- Mehdi GolariMGMehdi Golari
- Romain CamilleriRCRomain Camilleri
- Titouan JehlTJTitouan Jehl
- Chris SholleyCSChris Sholley
- Matthew LeventiMLMatthew Leventi
- Theresa CalderonTCTheresa Calderon
- Angela LamALAngela Lam
- Paul Havard DuclosPDPaul Havard Duclos
- Tim HollandTHTim Holland
- James KochJKJames Koch
Preprint
- 10 March 2026
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Ride-hailing platforms increasingly face uncertain driver acceptance, which makes traditional one-to-one exclusive dispatch (ED) less efficient: rejections and timeouts force sequential retries and lengthen rider wait times, which in turn creates friction in the marketplace. Non-exclusive dispatch (NED) mitigates this friction by broadcasting a request to multiple drivers in parallel. While NED can reduce latency, it introduces new design challenges—most notably, how to choose notification sets and how to resolve driver contention (when multiple drivers accept the same ride). In this paper—the second in a two-part collaboration with Lyft—we develop a theoretically grounded framework to evaluate the long-run performance and marketplace effects of transitioning from ED to NED. We bridge theory and practice by combining (i) an optimization model that formulates NED as a constrained welfare maximization problem with (ii) large-scale discrete-event simulations on proprietary Lyft traces and (iii) a stylized macroscopic equilibrium model. Across simulation and equilibrium analysis, we find that NED improves key fulfillment metrics relative to ED: it reduces match time (and hence rider reneging) while increasing both the number and the average quality of completed matches. We also quantify the speed--quality trade-off between two common contention rules, First-Accept and Best-Accept: First-Accept maximizes speed and throughput, whereas Best-Accept is required to maximize per-match quality. Finally, we show that slightly conservative notification heuristics can improve long-run efficiency by avoiding excessive locking of high-value drivers and preserving future availability.Keywords
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