Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation
Authors:
- Alan D. MorrisonAMAlan D. Morrison
- Lucy WhiteLWLucy White
- 20 May 2009
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Finance
- Vol. 64 (3) , 1099-1142
Abstract
We analyze the desirability of level playing fields in international financial regulation. In general, level playing fields impose the standards of the weakest regulator upon the best‐regulated economies. However, they may be desirable when capital is mobile because they counter a cherry‐picking effect that lowers the size and efficiency of banks in weaker economies. Hence, while a laissez faire policy favors the better‐regulated economy, level playing fields are good for weaker regulators. We show that multinational banking mitigates the cherry‐picking effect, and reduces the damage that a level playing field causes in the better‐regulated economy.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 26 references indexed in Scilit:
- Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and If so, Who Should Pay for it?SSRN Electronic Journal, 2009
- Crises and Capital Requirements in BankingAmerican Economic Review, 2005
- Bank Size and Risk-Taking under Basel IISSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
- Loan pricing under Basel capital requirementsJournal of Financial Intermediation, 2004
- Information and bank credit allocationJournal of Financial Economics, 2004
- Capital-market Liberalization, Globalization, and the IMFOxford Review of Economic Policy, 2004
- Foreign Banks and Credit Stability in Central and Eastern Europe: A Panel Data AnalysisSSRN Electronic Journal, 2003
- Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002
- The Need for Competition in International Securities RegulationSSRN Electronic Journal, 2001
- Regulatory structure in futures markets: Jurisdictional competition between the sec, the cftc, and other agenciesJournal of Futures Markets, 1984