Incentive Regulation of Multinational Enterprises*
Author:
- Giacomo CalzolariGCGiacomo Calzolari
- 13 January 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 45 (1) , 257-282
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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