Tax compliance as a coordination game
Authors:
- James AlmJAJames Alm
- Michael McKeeMMMichael McKee
- 1 July 2004
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 54 (3) , 297-312
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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