Economic institutions: explanations for conformity and room for deviation
Author:
- 9 October 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Institutional Economics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 81-108
Abstract
Why do economic agents conform with existing institutions? Drawing on economics and organizational institutionalism, this article identifies existing explanations, extends or refines some of them, suggests new ones, classifies these various explanations, and integrates them into an organized framework. One set of explanations focuses on conformity out of habit. The other refers to more conscious thought and behavior and considers coordination and increasing returns to adoption, social sanctions, informational differences, uncertainty, legitimacy, naturality, and lack of power/resources to deviate.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 48 references indexed in Scilit:
- Institutions and Social Structures1Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 2008
- Structure, institution, agency, habit, and reflexive deliberationJournal of Institutional Economics, 2008
- Economics and Identity*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2000
- Availability Cascades and Risk RegulationStanford Law Review, 1999
- The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy DiscountAmerican Journal of Sociology, 1999
- Ending the Family QuarrelAmerican Behavioral Scientist, 1997
- Fools Rush in? The Institutional Context of Industry CreationAcademy of Management Review, 1994
- The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational FieldsAmerican Sociological Review, 1983
- A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May be One ConsequenceThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1980
- Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and CeremonyAmerican Journal of Sociology, 1977