Encroached Entitlements: Corruption and Appropriation of Irrigation Water in Southern Pun Jab (Pakistan)
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Preprint
- 1 November 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
A game-theoretic model of an irrigation system is analyzed, where the rich farmer can divert water to his own benefit, and to the detriment of the poor farmer, against the payment of a bribe to the irrigation official. Because of asymmetric information about the quantity of water diverted, the poor farmer can only respond by lobbying politicians in order to increase the probability of sanctions being imposed on the corrupt official. This entails defensive lobbying by the rich farmer. The analysis is motivated by some field work performed in an irrigation system in Southern Punjab (Pakistan), which provides as well the data for the empirical analysis. For technical reasons, irrigation offers a unique opportunity to test the determinants of corruption and the effects of political interference.Keywords
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