Power, Connected Coalitions, and Efficiency: Challenges to the Council of the European Union
- 1 October 1999
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Political Science Review
- Vol. 20 (4) , 371-391
Abstract
This article is concerned with challenges to reforming the voting procedures of the Council of the European Union (EU). The next major waves of EU enlargement will cause the Union to increase to a membership of first twenty-one, and then twenty-six or possibly even more states. How does enlargement affect the Council's inherent “capacity to act” under the currently used qualified majority voting rule? It is demonstrated here that the expected increase in EU membership will most likely induce a larger “status quo bias” as compared to the present situation in the Council if the crucial majority decision quota is not lowered. In addition, the article is responding to some criticism that has been applied against assessing the leverage of EU governments in one of the EU's most important institutions: the Council of the EU. By resorting to techniques that capture the influence of a priori coalitions on the one hand and “connected coalitions” among EU governments on the other—applying n-person cooperative game theory—the piece illustrates how the assessment of relative voting leverage in the framework of weighted voting systems may be extended and applied to situations in which the specific distribution of members' preferences is known. These calculations are again relevant in the face of the upcoming rounds of EU enlargement and projects for institutional reform.Keywords
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