Cooperative Oligopoly Games with Boundedly Rational Firms
Authors:
- Paraskevas LekeasPLParaskevas Lekeas
- Giorgos StamatopoulosGSGiorgos Stamatopoulos
Preprint
- 2 January 2013
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cognitive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coaliKeywords
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