The Hidden Costs of Fairness in Platform Markets: The Dynamics of Lowering Developer Royalty Rates
- 1 November 2026
- journal article
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 72 (11) , 9501-9523
Abstract
Multisided platforms crucially rely on indirect network effects. When trying to strengthen these effects, platform owners face a fundamental challenge, namely, designing incentives to enhance developer effort and simultaneously ensuring the release of high-quality products on the platform. This paper highlights the costs associated with lowering royalty rates to boost developer effort, as such reductions increase the relative supply of lower-quality offerings, worsening information congestion problems and amplifying the importance of visibility-enhancing investments. We leverage the quasi random announcements made by Apple and Google, declaring their intention to reduce the royalty rate applied to small app developers from 30% to 15%. We analyze the implications of these reforms using a difference-in-differences approach, finding a substantial increase in small developers’ likelihood of releasing lower-quality and less original apps on iOS and Android after the announcements. These effects are neither paralleled by a comparable increase in high-quality app releases nor by an increase in small developers’ likelihood of launching venture-backed apps. Consistent with worsening information congestion problems because of an influx of low-quality apps, our findings show an increase in the marginal value of experienced user certifications and developers’ app store optimization efforts post announcement. Additionally, we observe that venture capitalists are increasingly concentrating their investments in ventures with higher (observable) quality. This paper was accepted by Anita McGahan, business strategy. Funding: This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Education [Project PID2022-138710NB-I00 funded by MCIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033/FEDER, UE]. A. Conti acknowledges financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation [Grant 100013_197807]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.0586 .Keywords
This publication has 44 references indexed in Scilit:
- Two-way fixed effects, the two-way mundlak regression, and difference-in-differences estimatorsEmpirical Economics, 2025
- Micro venture capitalStrategic Entrepreneurship Journal, 2023
- Difference-in-differences with variation in treatment timingJournal of Econometrics, 2021
- Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periodsJournal of Econometrics, 2021
- Platform ecosystems as meta‐organizations: Implications for platform strategiesStrategic Management Journal, 2020
- Optimal distinctiveness in platform markets: Leveraging complementors as legitimacy buffersStrategic Management Journal, 2020
- Networks, platforms, and strategy: Emerging views and next stepsStrategic Management Journal, 2016
- Platform competition: Strategic trade‐offs in platform marketsStrategic Management Journal, 2013
- Platform envelopmentStrategic Management Journal, 2011
- Chapter 3 Firms and Networks in Two-Sided Markets2006