A Matter of Respect: A Defense of the Dead Donor Rule and of a "Whole-Brain" Criterion for Determination of Death
Author:
- 13 May 2010
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 35 (3) , 330-364
Abstract
Many accounts of the historical development of neurological criteria for determination of death insufficiently distinguish between two strands of interpretation advanced by advocates of a “whole-brain” criterion. One strand focuses on the brain as the organ of integration. Another provides a far more complex and nuanced account, both of death and of a policy on the determination of death. Current criticisms of the whole-brain criterion are effective in refuting the first interpretation, but not the second, which is advanced in the 2008 President's Council report on the determination of death. In this essay, I seek to further develop this second strand of interpretation. I argue that policy on determination of death aligns moral, biological, and ontological death concepts. Morally, death marks the stage when respect is no longer owed. Biologically, death concerns integrated functioning of an organism as a whole. But the biological concepts are underdetermined. The moral concerns lead to selection of strong individuality concepts rather than weak ones. They also push criteria to the “far side” of the dying process. There is a countervailing consideration associated with optimizing the number of available organs, and this pushes to the “near side” of death. Policy is governed by a conviction that it is possible to align these moral and biological death concepts, but this conviction simply lays out an agenda. There is also a prescription—integral to the dead donor rule—that lexically prioritizes the deontic concerns and that seeks to balance the countervailing tendencies by using science-based refinements to make the line between life and death more precise. After showing how these concerns have been effectively aligned in the current policy, I present a modified variant of a “division” scenario and show how an “inverse decapitation problem” leads to a conclusive refutation of the nonbrain account of death.Keywords
This publication has 30 references indexed in Scilit:
- Off with your heads: isolated organs in early Soviet science and fictionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2009
- The Whole-Brain Concept of Death Remains Optimum Public PolicyJournal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 2006
- LettersHastings Center Report, 2006
- The Death of Whole-Brain Death: The Plague of the Disaggregators, Somaticists, and MentalistsThe Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, 2005
- Role of brain death and the dead-donor rule in the ethics of organ transplantationCritical Care Medicine, 2003
- Death, dying and donation: organ transplantation and the diagnosis of deathJournal of Medical Ethics, 2002
- The Brain and Somatic Integration: Insights Into the Standard Biological Rationale for Equating Brain Death With DeathThe Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine, 2001
- Is It Time to Abandon Brain Death?Hastings Center Report, 1997
- Thinking about the BodyHastings Center Report, 1985
- A Statutory Definition of the Standards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a ProposalUniversity of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1972