Liberalism and the Ideal of the Good Life
Author:
- Margaret MooreMMMargaret Moore
- 1 January 1991
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Review of Politics
- Vol. 53 (4) , 672-690
Abstract
This article examines a recent justificatory argument in defense of liberal political principles. Joseph Raz, inThe Morality of Freedom, and Will Kymlicka, in his bookLiberalism, Community and Culture, argue that liberalism is not based on skepticism or on an implausible individualist metaphysics, as its communitarian critics have contended. They argue that liberalism can be justified as an essential element in human flourishing. This article examines this justificatory argument for liberalism. It argues that this defense of liberalism fails to support the primacy that liberals accord to autonomy over all other values, but that this failure is instructive.Keywords
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