Ownership concentration among entrepreneurial firms: The growth-control trade-off
Authors:
- Shaojie LaiSLShaojie Lai
- Hongyan LiangHLHongyan Liang
- Zilong LiuZLZilong Liu
- Xiaoling PuXPXiaoling Pu
- Jianing ZhangJZJianing Zhang
- 1 March 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics & Finance
- Vol. 78, 122-140
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 54 references indexed in Scilit:
- Governance Problems in Closely Held CorporationsJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2011
- Testing Agency Theory with Entrepreneur Effort and WealthThe Journal of Finance, 2005
- Who's minding the store? Motivating and monitoring hired managers at small, closely held commercial banksJournal of Banking & Finance, 2001
- Economic and Systemic Explanations of Ownership Concentration among Europe's Largest CompaniesInternational Journal of the Economics of Business, 1999
- Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech RepublicJournal of Comparative Economics, 1999
- The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go PublicThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998
- Executive stock ownership and performance tracking faint tracesJournal of Financial Economics, 1997
- Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effectsBiometrika, 1983