Adversarial Graph Traversal
Authors:
- Elvan CeyhanECElvan Ceyhan
- Li ZhouLZLi Zhou
Preprint
Abstract
Suppose a Bayesian agent seeks to traverse a graph. Each time she crosses an edge, she pays a price. The first time she reaches a node, there is a payoff. She has an opponent who can reduce the payoffs. This paper uses adversarial risk analysis to find a solution to her route selection problem. It shows how the traveler is advantaged by having an accurate subjective distribution over the costs/payoffs and by having a Bayesian prior for her opponent's strategic choices. The results are relevant to military convoy routing, corporate competition, and certain games.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- Interdicting Attack Plans with Boundedly Rational Players and Multiple Attackers: An Adversarial Risk Analysis ApproachDecision Analysis, 2023
- Network routing for insurgency: An adversarial risk analysis frameworkNaval Research Logistics (NRL), 2011
- Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker–defender signaling gameEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 2010