THE STRATEGIC TIMING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Author:
- 24 February 2009
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 159-177
Abstract
This paper focuses on the strategic timing of elections by agenda‐setters in direct democracy settings. Because concurrent elections affect turnout, scheduling referenda for different elections will produce different median voters. I hypothesize that agenda‐setters with power over the timing of a referendum will schedule the referendum in conjunction with the other set of races that produce a policy closest to their preferred outcome. Consistent with the theory, I show that Wisconsin school boards' use of special elections for school referenda are related to differences in the revealed preferences of voters in low‐ and high‐turnout elections.Keywords
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