Unveiling information on opportunity costs in REDD: Who obtains the surplus when policy objectives differ?
Open Access
- 1 May 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Resource and Energy Economics
- Vol. 36 (2) , 508-527
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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Funding Information
- Danish National Science Foundation
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