Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups
Authors:
- 1 May 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Population Biology
- Vol. 73 (3) , 426-436
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (183845)
- Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (17103002)
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